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HOT or Not
Driver Elasticity to Price on the MnPASS HOT Lanes
Michael Janson and David Levinson
The Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT) has added MnPASS
High Occupancy Toll (HOT) lanes on two freeway corridors in the Twin Cities.
While not the first HOT lanes in the country, the MnPASS lanes are the first
implementation of road pricing in Minnesota and possess a dynamic pricing schedule.
Tolls charged to single occupancy vehicles (SOVs) are adjusted every three minutes
according to HOT lane vehicle density. Given the infancy of systems like MnPASS,
questions remain about drivers’ responses to toll prices. Three field experiments
were conducted on the corridors during which prices were changed. Data from
the field experiments as well as two years of toll and traffic data were analyzed to
measure driver responses to pricing changes. Driver elasticity to price was positive
with magnitudes less than 1.0. This positive relationship between price and demand
is in contrast with the previously held belief that raising the price would discourage
demand. In addition, drivers consistently paid between approximately $60-120 per
hour of travel time savings, much higher than the average value of time. Reasons
for these results is discussed as well as the implications these results have on the
pricing of HOT lanes.
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1 Introduction
Since 1992, the Minneapolis - St. Paul metropolitan area has used managed lanes to increase
person throughput during peak periods (Doan, 2013). With limited capacity and excess de-
mand, speeds slow during the morning and afternoon commute. I-394 stretches from the western
suburbs into downtown Minneapolis. The freeway originally contained high occupancy vehicle
(HOV) lanes, including a two lane, barrier separated, reversible section. This section runs along
approximately 1/3rd of the freeway’s length. The remaining section contains one concurrent,
double white line separated HOV lane running in each direction. In 2005, the Minnesota De-
partment of Transportation (MnDOT) converted the HOV lanes on I-394 to high occupancy
toll (HOT) lanes.
While the HOV lanes benefited carpools, motorcycles and buses, single occupant vehicle (SOVs)
drivers complained of their underutilization. In order to maintain the carpooling/transit in-
centive while utilizing the lanes to a greater extent, MnDOT explored the concept of HOT
lanes. HOT lanes are a form of congestion pricing. They are tolled lanes (on otherwise untolled
roads) which give a free or discounted trip for HOV users, and are thus optional. Other forms
of congestion pricing may charge for use of all lanes.
Support for HOT lanes appears across various income levels, household sizes and educational
levels (Munnich and Buckeye, 2007; Burris et al., 2007). In addition, support tends to increase
after implementation and is higher among areas with existing tolled roads (Finkleman et al.,
2011; Burris et al., 2007). Safirova et al. (2003) believes that while HOT lanes benefit all income
groups, they more greatly benefit the wealthy. Mowday (2006), on the other hand, believes
HOT lanes are equitable due to users paying directly for use of the road. Finkleman et al. (2011)
remarks that older, non-retired individuals and those new to their location support tolling more
than others. While retired individuals may object to tolling due to their fixed income, Burris
and Pendyala (2002) suggest that the retired and others on flexible schedules can more easily
adjust their trips to avoid tolls and congestion.
While the idea seems to appease all sides of the debate, concerns arose, especially by those
already using the HOV lanes (Burris et al., 2007). Transit proponents feared that the LOS
in the HOT lanes would degrade (Turnbull, 2008). Turnbull (2008) and Burris and Xu (2006)
analyzed the potential mode shift from transit to SOV. All cases resulted in either a statistically
insignificant change or small enough change not to affect LOS. Munnich and Buckeye (2007)
observed a similar conservation of LOS on I-394 in Minneapolis after the conversion from HOV
to HOT. In an analysis of the HOT lane conversion on I-85 in Atlanta, Kall et al. (2009)
determined no statistically significant change in emissions levels due to mode shifting from the
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conversion. Dahlgren (2002) adds that lower emissions may result from HOT lanes due to
reduced GP congestion.
In order to guarantee that HOVs could continue to use the HOT lanes at a high LOS, MnDOT
adopted a dynamic pricing system. Similar systems had been adopted on several HOT lanes
around the country, but none with such frequent price changes. The toll price for SOVs is
displayed at various plazas along the corridor. Loop detectors monitor the density in the HOT
lanes. As density in the HOT lanes rises, so too does the toll price. As congestion clears and
density decreases, the price lowers again. Dynamic pricing, in theory, allows MnDOT to control
the amount of SOV traffic in the HOT lanes and maintain a high LOS. This paper reexamines
that assumption.
Although I-394 was not the first HOT lane corridor in the country, few before had implemented
a dynamic pricing scheme with such frequent pricing changes (every three minutes). The
MnPASS Express Lanes, as the HOT lanes are called in Minnesota, have been running since
2005. In 2009, MnDOT added MnPASS lanes to the I-35W corridor. One MnPASS lane runs in
each direction, separated by a double white line. In the southbound direction, the lane begins
at 42nd Street South in Minneapolis and continues to the southern suburb of Lakeville. The
northbound lane begins in Lakeville and continues to 38th Street South in Minneapolis where
it becomes a priced dynamic shoulder lane (PDSL). The shoulder lane continues to downtown
Minneapolis (MnDOT, 2013a). The success of the lanes has created interest for expansion to
other metro freeways (Cambridge Systematics, 2010).
Given that dynamically priced HOT lanes is a relatively new concept, questions exist how
optimal the current MnPASS pricing algorithm is at maximizing throughput while maintaining
free flow speeds. The current algorithm operates by raising prices as the density in the MnPASS
lanes rises. The assumption is that higher prices will dissuade usage and lower prices will entice
users. Through this fluctuation in price, demand in the MnPASS lanes can be regulated and
breakdown prevented.
This paper analyzes driving behavior, specifically looking at how much drivers pay for time
savings and and their elasticity to change in price. By better understanding drivers’ responses
to price, changes can be made to the pricing algorithm to better control the amount of demand.
Current assumptions about drivers’ responses to pricing changes will be examined. Driving
behavior is analyzed by looking at changes to price in demand using various data sources and
methods.
Data sources for the analyses include loop detectors, logs of price and density measurements
from MnPASS as well as logs of individual MnPASS subscribers’ transponder data. Three field
experiments were implemented during which pricing changes were made. The methods and
results as well as their implications are discussed in the following sections.
2 Background
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2.1 Frequency of Use
Each paying MnPASS user has a transponder, which communicates with detectors along the
corridor to determine a user’s entry and exit point and charge accordingly. The time of entry,
amount charged and entry and exit plazas is recorded for each trip. This log was used to deter-
mine how frequently MnPASS subscribers pay to use the lanes. Subscribers are charged $1.50
per month for leasing the transponder. The frequency of use analysis includes all subscribers
throughout 2011 and 2012 and averages their use over the two-year period. It is not limited to
those subscribers whose lease remains active over the entire two-year period.
The frequency of use analysis focused on personal and business accounts separately. No data
were provided by MnPASS to specifically determine which accounts are business and which are
personal. Therefore, the assumption was made that accounts with more than two transponders
were business accounts, while those with one or two were personal. There are likely some
personal accounts with more than two transponders and some business accounts with fewer than
three, however two transponders was selected as a reasonable limit for most personal accounts.
Personal and business accounts were separated based on the assumption that drivers with
business accounts are less sensitive to price, because they are not charged the toll personally.
This is true regardless of trip purpose. Individual accounts make up around 76 % of all MnPASS
accounts. Unless explicitly stated, analysis throughout this paper includes both business and
personal accounts due to the inability to distinguish the two using loop detector data.
Figure 1 below depicts the number of MnPASS subscribers in 2011 and 2012 and the breakdown
based on frequency of use during the morning peak period (weekdays/year). The data are
divided into accounts which had two or fewer transponders (“individual accounts”) and accounts
with at least 3 transponders (“business accounts”). The data sets were fitted with exponential
decay functions. The functions, their equation and respective r2 values are displayed.
The results indicate that most users do not use the MnPASS lanes every weekday for their
commute, but rather select various days to use the lanes. Graphs in the appendix show that
the number for trips among different frequencies of users is fairly constant for individual users.
For business accounts, the number of trips declines steadily with frequency.
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Figure 1: Frequency of Use - 2011 & 2012
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Figure 2: Data taken over all weekdays in 2011 and 2012
Trips include any paid use of the MnPASS lanes
2.2 Current Operation
Figures 3 and 4 display the MnPASS entry and exit points along I-394 and I-35W. Outside of
these points, drivers are not supposed to enter or exit the MnPASS lanes. Double white lines
separate the lanes except during the entry and exit points, during which the lines are dashed.
The hours of operations are summarized in Table 1 below.
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Figure 3: MnPASS Entry and Exit Points on I-394
MnPASS (http://www.mnpass.org/)
Figure 4: MnPASS Entry and Exit Points on I-35W
MnPASS (http://www.mnpass.org/)
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Table 1: Hours of Operation
Corridor Direction Section Start Time End Time
I-394 EB I-494 to Hwy 100 6:00 10:00
I-394 EB Hwy 100 to Downtown Minneapolis 6:00 13:00
I-394 WB Hwy 100 to I-494 14:00 19:00
I-394 WB Downtown Minneapolis to Hwy 100 14:00 5:00
I-35W NB Crystal Lake Road to Hwy 62 6:00 10:00
I-35W NB Hwy 62 to Downtown Minneapolis 6:00, 15:00 10:00, 19:00
I-35W SB 42nd St to I-494 6:00, 15:00 10:00, 19:00
I-35W SB I-494 to Hwy 13 15:00 19:00
Prices during operation times range from a minimum of $0.25 to a maximum $8.00. I-394 and
I-35W are each divided into multiple sections with prices posted for use of each segment. The
maximum price applies to use of each section individually, as well as use of all sections.
Prices are adjusted every three minutes based density levels measured in the MnPASS lanes
only. Traffic levels in the GP lanes does not influence price. Loop detector counts are taken
every 30 seconds. These counts are used to calculate the density in the MnPASS lanes at
various plazas along the corridor. Each plaza consists of a multiple parallel detectors, one
for each lane. Density measurements are averaged over the last 6 minute period in order to
smooth out fluctuations. Drivers are charged based on the maximum density downstream of
their entrance point. Densities upstream do not influence the paid price. Price is dictated by
the magnitude of density as well as the change in density over the previous 6 minutes. A rise
in density creates an increase in price. Table 2 displays the pricing plan, which regulates the
price based on density level. Minimums and maximums for a given LOS must be maintained.
Table 3 indicates the changes in price caused by a change in density.
Table 2: Pricing Plan for Normal Operation of MnPASS Lanes (both I-35W and I-394)
Level of Service Min K Max K Min Toll ($) Default Toll ($) Max Toll ($)
A 0 11 0.25 0.25 0.50
B 12 18 0.50 0.50 1.50
C 19 31 1.50 1.50 2.50
D 32 42 2.50 3.00 3.50
E 43 49 3.50 5.00 5.00
F 50 50 5.00 8.00 8.00
Density in veh/mi/ln; Prices in $
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Table 3: Price Changes Based on Changes in Density - Used for all pricing plans
Density ∆ 1 ∆ 2 ∆ 3 ∆ 4 ∆ 5 ∆ 6
0-18 $0.25 $0.25 $0.25 $0.25 $0.25 $0.25
19+ $0.25 $0.50 $0.75 $1.00 $1.25 $1.50
Density in veh/mi/ln
Price increases between $0.25 and $1.50 with a change in density between 1 and 6 veh/mi/ln
2.3 Average Tolls and Time Savings
The average payment for time savings on the MnPASS lanes was calculated for I-394 and I-
35W for both the morning and afternoon peak periods. Two years of toll and loop detector
data (2011 & 2012) were gathered in order to compute the average time savings for using
the MnPASS lanes and the average paid toll. Pricing data came directly from logs provided
by the MnPASS operators. Prices were provided for each plaza along the corridor, every 3
minutes. These represent posted prices and not individually paid prices. Average toll prices
were computed by weighing the posted prices by the number of users experiencing a given price
(reported MnPASS lane density). The average paid toll price also assumes use of the entire
MnPASS corridor. Averages are calculated over the entire paid MnPASS periods 6:00-10:00 &
14:00-19:00 for I-394 and 6:00-10:00 & 15:00-19:00 for I-35W.
Time savings was calculated using loop detector data from the MnPASS and GP lanes. Com-
mute times for the GP and MnPASS lanes were calculated assuming use of the entire corridor.
The time savings assumes drivers are entering downtown Minneapolis during the morning com-
mute. It does not account for time savings as a result of avoiding the queue to I-94 eastbound or
other similar circumstances. The MnPASS corridor stretches approximately 12.4 miles (19.96
km) on I-394 and 16 miles (25.75 km) on I-35W. Calibrated field lengths were used for the
detectors, which provide occupancy data every 30 seconds. Loop detectors only measure point
occupancies and flows. Speeds are estimates and may vary between point measurements. These
variations cannot be captured with this data. Average speeds were calculated for each series
of detectors along the corridor. Speeds were averaged over a three-minute time period, corre-
sponding to the frequency of pricing changes.
In order to reduce extraneous speeds caused by varying vehicle sizes or detector reading inaccu-
racies, two filtering methods were applied. First, speeds exceeding 75 mph (120.7 km·h−1) were
eliminated. Speed limits along the MnPASS corridors are most commonly 55 or 60 mph (88.5 or
96.6 km·h−1), with a stretch of I-35W at 65 mph (104.6 km·h−1) near the southern edge of the
system. Second, interval speeds calculated from a single vehicle were eliminated to reduce the
likelihood of inaccurate speed measurements (caused by very large or very small vehicles). A
low speed threshold was not applied given that any non-negative speed was possible. Negative
speeds were, however, naturally eliminated if they existed.
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Travel times for the MnPASS and GP lanes were then calculated using the speeds from each
detector series and computing the time required to traverse the entire MnPASS corridor length.
Calculations were carried out for I-394 and I-35W over the entire morning and afternoon price
enforced periods and averaged. Travel time savings were the differences in commute times
between the MnPASS and GP lanes. Like the average prices, time savings was weighted based
on density. Willingness to pay was computed using the weighted averages of time savings and
toll price. Therefore, although data were averaged over the entire peak period, heavier demand
periods were given greater weight. The resulting values are discussed later.
Table 4 displays willingness to pay values from several previous studies. These studies were
selected because they represent similar HOT lane facilities to MnPASS. Burris et al. (2012) also
includes values for a study on the I-394 MnPASS lanes. The values from this study represent the
average toll prices paid and the respective average time savings. This differs from willingness to
pay, because it is not known what users would be willing to pay. These values simply represent
what users pay and the resulting time savings they gain as a result.
Average weighted toll prices and time savings during the morning and afternoon peak periods
on I-394 and I-35W are displayed in Table 5. Averages are weighted based on the number
of users experiencing the price or time savings. The average toll price for the peak periods
ranges from $1.37 to $2.91. The minimum and maximum tolls are $0.25 and $8.00 respectively.
Average time savings for MnPASS users ranges from less than a minute (0.78 min) on I-394 in
the afternoon to 2.87 minutes on I-35W in the morning peak. With the I-394 corridor running
12.4 miles (20 km), MnPASS users experienced 8.1 seconds/mile (5.0 sec/km) average time
savings in the morning and 3.8 seconds/mile (2.4 sec/km) in the afternoon. The MnPASS lanes
on I-35W stretch 16 miles (25.7 km), providing 10.8 second/mile (6.7 second/km) average time
savings during the morning commute and 4.8 seconds/mile (2.98 second/km) in the afternoon.
These values allow for better direct comparison of the time savings between I-394 and I-35W.
The average time savings and toll price values yielded price paid for time savings values from
$60.77 to $124.10 per hour. These values are much higher than typical values of time (VOT).
MnDOT, for example, uses a VOT of $15.60 (MnDOT, 2013b). Burris et al. (2012) found
similarly high values of time on I-394, $73/hr during the morning commute and $116/hr in the
afternoon. Steimetz and Brownstone (2005) discuss wide ranging VOT values and methods for
better handling noisy data.
There are several possible explanations for the high VOT. First, it is expected that users of HOT
lanes have a higher than average VOT, as most travelers do not use the lanes. Furthermore,
both individual and business accounts make up the toll paying users. The higher VOT for
businesses raises the overall VOT value. The second reason is distorted driver perception. As
shown by Ghosh (2001) and Yan (2002), drivers have a distorted perception of reality and
likely perceive their time savings to be greater than reality. MnPASS users probably do not
realize how minimal their time savings is on average (Parthasarathi et al., 2012). A third
factor is that the VOT includes value of reliability (VOR), which represents the monetary
value placed on reduced travel variability (Carrion and Levinson, 2012b). VOR is difficult
to separately quantify, particularly in dynamic pricing experiments where there is a strong
correlation between price and reliability (Brownstone and Small, 2005). Studies have placed the
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reliability ratio (VOR/VOT) anywhere between 0.10 and 2.8 (Carrion and Levinson, 2012a,b).
The MnPASS lanes provide consistent travel time with a very small likelihood of breakdown.
Therefore, some of the VOT is likely due to the increased reliability provide by the lanes. The
MnPASS lanes provide other intangibles which are also important. The more consistent traffic
flow makes driving in the MnPASS lanes safer and less stressful. Consistent driving speeds
yield better gas mileage. Finally, MnPASS users may take advantage of queue jumps provided
by the lanes. Users traveling WB on I-394 and headed south on Hwy 100, can bypass the queue
that often forms. Likewise, morning commuters heading east on I-394 can avoid the queue to
enter I-94 eastbound. All of these are important benefits provided by the lanes which influence
the price drivers are willing to pay for the MnPASS lanes.
Table 4: Willingness to Pay from Literature
Reference Willingness to Pay Notes
Brownstone et al. (2003) $30/hr I-15 in San Diego
Burris et al. (2012) $73/hr & $116/hr I-394 Morning & Afternoon
$49/hr & $54/hr I-15 Morning & Afternoon
Devarasetty et al. (2012) $51/hr I-10 (Katy Freeway)
Table 5: Average Toll Prices and Time Savings - 2011 & 2012
Avg. Price (P) Avg Time Savings (min) Cost/Time Savings ($/hr)
I-394 Morning 2.579 1.673 92.49
I-394 Afternoon 1.369 0.777 105.70
I-35W Morning 2.909 2.872 60.77





Data taken over all weekdays in 2011 and 2012
3 Economic Theory - Demand Curve of Toll Roads
Most goods are ordinary goods following the downward sloping demand curve where quantity
consumed decreases as price rises as seen in Figure 5a (Beggs, 2010).
Some luxury goods, on the other hand, may see an increase in consumption as price rises (at
least for certain prices). Figure 5b represents this phenomenon (Beggs, 2010). As reported in
the Miami Herald (2010), drivers on I-95 may increase consumption of the toll lane as price
rises. Drivers see the toll price as a signal of congestion in the untolled lanes and use of the
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tolled lanes increases. Therefore, a higher price leads to greater consumption. Does this mean
toll roads have an upward sloping demand curve like a Veblen Good?
Beggs (2010) believes this is, in fact, not the case. In moving up the demand curve in Figure 5b,
the assumption is that all other factors are held constant. In the HOT lane case, this assumption
breaks down. The belief of drivers is that the higher price indicates greater congestion and
increased time savings. Therefore, drivers are assessing their willingness to pay for two different
goods with different amounts of time savings. If time savings is held constant, HOT lanes follow
a typical downward sloping demand curve where quantity decreases with an increase in price.
Beggs (2010) suggests that perhaps, what is really happening as price increases, is that the
demand curve is shifting to the right as seen in Figure 5c. Drivers regard the higher priced
HOT lane as a different good (one which provides greater time savings), for which they have
a different demand curve. Beggs (2010) demonstrates this by noting that if price were held
constant, but time savings increased, then quantity consumed would increase to Q3 on the
right shifted demand curve. Therefore, HOT lanes are likely not Veblen Goods, but rather
ordinary goods represented by different demand curves based on their properties (i.e. time
savings).
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4 Aggregate Analysis: Methods and Results
Understanding the elasticity to price of MnPASS drivers is important to determine an optimal
pricing plan. Very inelastic behavior would mean large price changes would do very little to
change the demand of the MnPASS lanes. This would cause difficulty in regulating MnPASS
demand. Very elastic behavior, on the other hand, would mean large changes to demand from
a small price change. This could lead to erratic changes in demand from small toll fluctuations.
Equally important to the magnitude of elasticity is the positive or negative relationship between
price and demand. Does MnPASS demand increase or decrease with an increase in price? The
assumption until now how has been that MnPASS lanes are a simple ordinary good, meaning an
increase in price corresponds to a decrease in demand. However, as discussed by Beggs (2010),
this is not always the case for HOT lanes, which may see increases in demand corresponding
to higher prices.
Prices for elasticity calculations came directly from the MnPASS system logs. The MnPASS
logs store posted prices and their corresponding density levels.
Demand was measured using several methods. MnPASS logs store the calculated densities,
which determine price. These densities measure HOVs and SOVs in the HOT lane. Transponder
data provides demand at an individual level. Transponder logs only record paying SOVs. Loop
detector data were also used in order to calculate the lane share percentage of the MnPASS
lanes as well as the vehicle flow for the SOV and HOV usage section. The MnPASS lane share
percentage includes all MnPASS lane users and is not limited to paying SOVs. It measures the
percentage of overall flow using the MnPASS lane. This helps control against overall fluctuations
in traffic due to various externalities since it accounts for general purpose lane volumes as well
as MnPASS. Holidays, poor weather days and other known anomalies, however, were excluded





Where SMnPASS denotes MnPASS lane share percentage. Q represents flow in the respective
lane type. Flow for the general purpose lanes is the sum of all general purpose lanes.
Table 6 displays driver elasticity to price results from several previous papers. Several of the
studies come from an analysis by Burris (2003). All values are negative and smaller in magnitude
than -1.0. Elasticity results using various methods are displayed and discussed in the following
sections.
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Table 6: Driver Elasticity to Price from Literature
Reference Elasticity(ε) Notes
Wuestefeld and Regan (1981) -0.03 to -0.31
Oum et al. (1992) -0.09 to -0.52
The Transportation Research Board (1994) -0.10 to -0.40
Hirschman (1995) -0.10 Bridges and tunnels in NYC
The Urban Transportation Monitor (2000) -0.20
Burris and Pendyala (2002) -0.03 to -0.36 Toll bridges in Lee County, FL
Odeck & Br̊athen (2008) -0.45 & -0.82 Short-run and Long-run
Several studies taken from Burris (2003)
Two years of MnPASS demand and pricing data (2011 and 2012) were gathered to examine
aggregate demand responses to changes in price. Average price and demand (density and
MnPASS lane share %) were plotted every 3 minutes throughout the peak period. The data is
taken from the critical plazas discussed earlier. The prices and densities correspond to the logs
from the MnPASS system. SMnPASS is calculated from loop detector data.
The MnPASS pricing algorithm operates by changing price at time, [t+3:t+6], according to
changes in demand between [t:t+3] (which is also averaged with the change in the previous
3 minutes). Price is responding to demand. In order to measure driver elasticity to price, it
is necessary to examine changes to demand following changes in price. We are interested in
how demand is responding to changes in price and not the other way around. Elasticity was,









Where D represents demand (density or SMnPASS), P represents price and epsilon the resulting
elasticity.
Two years (2011 & 2012) of price, density and SMnPASS data for the I-394 and I-35W morning
peak periods are plotted in Figure 6 and Figure 7. Afternoon peak data are displayed in Figure
8 and Figure 9. Points are plotted every 3 minutes to correspond with the price changes.
Twelve minute moving averages were used to smooth the data. The error bars represent one
standard deviation in each direction. With the exception of 6 weeks during 2011 and 2012, the
pricing plan for the lanes remained constant. Any changes which occurred were similar to the
field experiment described earlier.
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Data taken over all weekdays in 2011 and 2012
Data from Plaza 1003, between Hwy 169 and Louisiana Ave on EB I-394
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Data taken over all weekdays in 2011 and 2012
Data from Plaza 3012 near 46th Street on NB I-35W
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Data taken over all weekdays in 2011 and 2012
Data from Plaza 2003, between Louisiana Ave and Hwy 169 on WB I-394
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Data taken over all weekdays in 2011 and 2012
Data from Plaza 4009 near 98th Street on SB I-35W
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Table 7: Elasticity Values Using Density and MnPASS Lane Share: 2011 & 2012 Aggregate
Density Elasticity (Density)
Average Average Median Std Dev
I-394 Morning (1003) 23.75 0.8005* 0.6164 0.8387
I-394 Afternoon (2003) 14.05 0.4885* 0.6170 1.018
I-35W Morning (3005) 25.99 0.7448* 0.7331 0.9176
I-35W Morning (3012) 22.64 0.8400* 0.7813 0.3804
I-35W Afternoon (4009) 19.99 0.6320* 0.6117 1.140
I-35W Afternoon (4011) 15.28 0.4880 0.4487 2.332
SMnPASS Elasticity (SMnPASS)
Average Average Median Std Dev
I-394 Morning (1003) 19.82 0.7010* 0.6487 0.7754
I-394 Afternoon (2003) 12.69 0.4638* 0.3818 1.129
I-35W Morning (3005) 22.37 0.1775 0.3911 1.124
I-35W Morning (3012) 13.55 0.6491* 0.5936 0.5044
I-35W Afternoon (4009) 23.75 0.3943* 0.2964 0.7842
I-35W Afternoon (4011) 17.58 0.3392* 0.2264 0.6292
* Significant at 0.05 significance level
Plaza in parentheses
Density in units veh/mi/ln





Data taken over all weekdays in 2011 and 2012
Plaza 1003, 2003 lanes: 1 HOT, 2 GP, 1 Auxilliary
Plaza 3005, 4009 lanes: 1 HOT, 2 GP
Plaza 4011 lanes: 1 HOT, 3 GP
Plaza 3012 lanes: 1 HOT, 4 GP
All statistically significant elasticity values from the aggregate data are positive and between
0.3392 and 0.8400.
The MnPASS pricing algorithm operates by changing price to match changes in demand (raising
price with increasing demand). This analysis, however, looks at changes to demand immediately
following pricing changes, in order to examine the response of demand to price. Overall, the
analysis revealed that demand (both density and SMnPASS) typically increased immediately
following a price increase and vice versa.
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5 Field Experiment Analysis: Methods and Results
Several field experiments were conducted between October 2012 and January 2013. Drivers
were never made aware of any changes to the pricing plan.
The first field experiment took place on I-394 between October 8, 2012 and November 2, 2012.
The second field experiment took place on I-35W between October 29,2012 and November 23,
2012. Details of these experiments including methodology and analysis can be found in Janson
and Levinson (2013). However, some of the results are included below for reference. The
third field experiment was conducted on I-394 lasting five weeks. The experiment consisted of
changes to the pricing plan displayed in Table 8 and took place in December 7-21, 2012 and
January 7-25, 2013. No changes were made to Table 3, displayed above. The holiday season
at the end of December and beginning of January was excluded. The density thresholds at
which prices changed were lowered during this experiment, effectively increasing price. The
change was estimated to increase the average price by around 15%. All other operations of
the pricing algorithm were left the same. After the experiment, prices were reverted to their
previous levels.
Table 8: Modified pricing plan for second field experiment on I-394
2012-12-10 to 2012-12-21 & 2012-1-7 to 2013-1-25
Level of Service Min K Max K Min Toll ($) Default Toll ($) Max Toll ($)
A 0 9 0.25 0.25 0.50
B 10 15 0.50 0.50 1.50
C 16 25 1.50 1.50 2.50
D 26 34 2.50 3.00 3.50
E 35 39 3.50 5.00 5.00
F 40 50 5.00 8.00 8.00
Density in veh/mi/ln; Prices in $
The field experiments were analyzed by comparing to the same days on year prior. For example,
if the experiment began on the first Monday in October, that same Monday the year before
was used as the start date. In order to account for changes occurring between 2011 and 2012, a
control period was analyzed. The control period usually consists of one month prior to the field
experiment. The changes in the control period between 2011 and 2012 can then be compared
to the changes between the baseline period and the field experiment. The control periods and
baseline period all contained the same pricing plan. This helps determine which changes are
caused by the changes to the pricing plan and helps eliminate other confounds such as fuel
prices and employment. MinnesotaGasPrices.com (2013) reveals, however, that average fuel
prices in Minnesota between 2011 and 2012 are within $0.50. Anomalies such as holidays and
poor weather days were removed from analysis. In addition, no changes to express transit
service on the corridors were made during the analysis period (Metropolitan Council, 2013)
20
Price and demand data from the field experiments were taken from specific plazas along the
corridor. The selected points represent plazas which typically have the maximum density com-
pared to upstream plazas. Therefore, the density at these critical plazas (as they will be referred
to) is often responsible for the posted prices upstream. Data for I-394 used price and demand
measurements from plaza 1003 in the eastbound direction and plaza 2003 westbound. These
plazas include the section of I-394 between Hwy 169 and Louisiana Ave.
Driver elasticity for the field experiment was calculated by comparing price and demand to a
baseline period. Average price and demand every three minutes throughout the peak period
was calculated as well as the overall weighted average price and density. This was done for each
week of the field experiments as well as same period one year prior. Data corresponds to the
critical plazas discussed earlier. Prices and densities for this analysis come from the MnPASS
system logs. SMnPASS is calculated from loop detector data. Elasticity was calculated twice.
Once by looking at the changes in price and demand between the two periods for every three-
minute period. Elasticity values were then calculated for each 3 minute period and averaged
to yield an average of elasticities. The other method compared the overall weighted prices and
densities for the two periods. This yielded an elasticity of averages measurement. This same
procedure was done for a control period, comparing 2011 and 2012 one month before each field
experiment. The control periods utilized the same pricing plan as the baseline period. The
final elasticity for the field experiments was the net change occurring between the baseline and



























Where the subscript E denotes the field experiment and the subscript B denotes the baseline
period. The control period is noted by subscript C and each period is marked with its respec-
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tive year. D represents demand (density or SMnPASS), P represents price and ε the resulting
elasticity.
The following figures display changes in price and density for the third field experiment and
its control. Twelve minute moving averages were used to smooth the data. The error bars
represent one standard deviation in each direction.
Data in Figure 10 show the average price and density levels during the morning peak period on
I-394. The field experiment includes 2 weeks in December 2012 (12/7-12/21) and 3 weeks in
January 2013 (1/7-1/25). The baseline period includes the same days as the field experiment,
but one year prior. Prices were increased during the field experiment by lowering density
thresholds. Average paid prices throughout the morning peak period were consistently higher
during the 5 week experiment.
Figure 11 represents the control period which compares November 2011 (2011-11-18 to 2011-12-
9) and November 2012 (2012-11-16 to 2012-12-7). This period represent 3 weeks preceding the
field experiment. The first two weeks in November could not be used in the control because the
pricing plan during these weeks in 2012 was set to match the pricing plan from 2005 instead
of the baseline plan in Table 2. The resulting changes in the control were relatively small
compared to the changes seen in Figure 11 between the baseline and field experiment.
Figure 10 reveals that the MnPASS lanes saw a consistent increase in density throughout the
peak period during the field experiment. Although less than the price increase, density at nearly
every time segment during the analyzed periods was higher. This led to the positive elasticity
results displayed in Tables 10 and 11.
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2012-12-10 to 2012-12-21 & 2013-1-7 to 2013-1-25
2011-12-12 to 2011-12-23 & 2012-1-9 to 2012-1-27
Plaza 1003, between Hwy 169 and Louisiana Ave on EB I-394; Weekdays only
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Plaza 1003, between Hwy 169 and Louisiana Ave on EB I-394; Weekdays only
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Table 9 displays weighted averages of price and density for the baseline, field experiment and
control periods. A net change between the baseline and field experiment, including changes in
the control, are also displayed. The number of lanes corresponding to the SMnPASS are displayed
below the table. Average general purpose lane speeds are included as another measure of change
between the periods. Elasticity was calculated using both density and SMnPASS as a measure
of demand. Table 10 shows the elasticity values calculated from the weighted averages in Table
9. Results in Table 11 include the mean, median and standard deviation of elasticity values for
every three minutes between 7:00-9:00.
The third field experiment saw statistically significant increases in price and density both be-
tween the baseline and field experiment. The control period only saw a significant change in
SMnPASS between 2011 and 2012. There was no statistically significant change in the average
GP speed. The net values were all positive, resulting in positive elasticity values in Table 11.
The average of individual elasticity measurements were also positive and statistically significant
between the baseline and field experiment for both density and SMnPASS. Unlike the other field
experiments, price, density and SMnPASS for this experiment saw consistent increases across all
time periods and density levels. This can be seen in Figure 10. This consistency led to steady
elasticity results and the small standard deviation values. Another indication of consistency
are the similar mean and median values.
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Table 9: Weighted Averages
Baseline Field Experiment % Change Control % Change Net % Change
(1) Plaza 1003
Price 2.024 2.418 19.45* 16.09* 3.353
Density 25.31 27.50 10.54* 9.657* 0.885
SMnPASS 20.76 21.50 3.566 1.627 1.939
GPspeed 91.5 93.8 2.5 0.9 1.6
(2) Plaza 3005
Price 2.010 2.229 10.88* 68.75* -57.87
Density 24.98 30.92 23.79* 37.41* -13.62
SMnPASS 22.36 24.13 7.871* 16.17* -8.301
GPspeed 90.1 89.3 -0.9 2.2 -3.1
Plaza 3012
Price 1.71 1.882 9.717 38.04* -28.33
Density 21.74 25.78 18.61* 22.45* -3.840
SMnPASS 13.36 15.56 16.49* 12.02* 4.471
GPspeed 87.6 85.8 -2.1 -0.8 -1.3
(3) Plaza 1003
Price 2.192 3.044 38.84* -2.569 41.41
Density 26.03 28.07 7.830* -6.381 14.21
SMnPASS 20.9 20.99 2.980 -8.217* 11.20
GPspeed 91.9 88.0 -4.24 -4.04 0.20
* Significant at 0.05 significance level
Time of Day: 7:00-9:00
Density in units veh/mi/ln
Speed in km/h
SMnPASS is percent of overall flow using the MnPASS lane
(1) I394: FE: 2012-10-8 to 2012-11-2, Base: 2011-10-10 to 2011-11-4, Control: September 2011 and 2012
(2) I35W: FE: 2012-10-29 to 2012-11-23, Base: 2011-10-31 to 2011-11-25, Control: October 2011 and 2012
(3) I394: FE 2012-12-10 to 2012-12-21 & 2013-1-7 to 2013-1-25, Base: 2011-12-12 to 2011-12-23 & 2012-1-9
to 2012-1-27, Control: November 2011 and 2012
Plaza 1003 lanes: 1 HOT, 2 GP, 1 Auxilliary
Plaza 3005 lanes: 1 HOT, 2 GP
Plaza 3012 lanes: 1 HOT, 4 GP
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Table 10: Elasticity of Averages














Time of Day: 7:00-9:00
(1) I394: FE: 2012-10-8 to 2012-11-2, Base: 2011-10-10 to 2011-11-4, Control: September 2011 and 2012
(2) I35W: FE: 2012-10-29 to 2012-11-23, Base: 2011-10-31 to 2011-11-25, Control: October 2011 and 2012
(3) I394: FE 2012-12-10 to 2012-12-21 & 2013-1-7 to 2013-1-25, Base: 2011-12-12 to 2011-12-23 & 2012-1-9
to 2012-1-27, Control: November 2011 and 2012
27
Table 11: Average of Elasticities
Demand Measure Mean Median Std Dev
(1) Plaza 1003
Density (FE) -0.9719 0.1245 7.385
SMnPASS (FE) -1.192 -0.0719 7.920
Density (Control) 0.5058* 0.4613 0.8900
SMnPASS (Control) 0.1377* 0.0495 0.3914
(2)
Plaza 3005
Density (FE) -2.769 -0.2377 18.05
SMnPASS (FE) -1.624 -0.2695 9.520
Density (Control) 0.6654* 0.5440 0.0236
SMnPASS(Control) 0.3131* 0.2836 0.1752
Plaza 3012
Density (FE) -2.581 0.7562 22.44
SMnPASS (FE) -2.8290 0.4052 22.29
Density (Control) 0.6925* 0.6035 0.2870
SMnPASS (Control) 0.4522* 0.3965 0.3129
(3) Plaza 1003
Density (FE) 0.2110* 0.2307 0.0874
SMnPASS (FE) 0.0981* 0.1011 0.0755
Density (Control) 1.016 1.159 3.148
SMnPASS (Control) 0.8144 0.9299 2.447
* Significant at 0.05 significance level
Time of Day: 7:00-9:00
(1) I394: FE: 2012-10-8 to 2012-11-2, Base: 2011-10-10 to 2011-11-4, Control: September 2011 and 2012
(2) I35W: FE: 2012-10-29 to 2012-11-23, Base: 2011-10-31 to 2011-11-25, Control: October 2011 and 2012
(3) I394: FE 2012-12-10 to 2012-12-21 & 2013-1-7 to 2013-1-25, Base: 2011-12-12 to 2011-12-23 & 2012-1-9
to 2012-1-27, Control: November 2011 and 2012
Loop detector data were used to determine the total number of MnPASS lanes users (HOV +
SOV) along the two corridors. Counts were gathered for the critical plaza(s) on each corridor
using loop detector 5453 for eastbound I-394 and 5460 for westbound. On I-35W, loop detectors
525 and 6792 in the northbound direction were used and 1000 and 1008 in the southbound
direction. The transponder logs record the starting and ending plaza for paying SOVs, along
with their starting time and paid toll. The assumption was made that drivers do not exit the
MnPASS lane between their starting and ending plaza. Therefore, a paying SOV is counted
at each plaza between their starting and ending plaza. If the critical plaza lies between the
starting and ending plaza, the vehicle is counted as a paying SOV. Cross-referencing these two
data sources, independent counts for SOV and HOV can be determined. SOV in this case
excludes “business account” which are those accounts with more than two transponders.
Vehicle counts from the field experiment as well as the baseline period were gathered. The
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tolls paid by SOVs were used to find the average price paid for each period. The changes in
price and SOV vehicle counts were used to determine the elasticity to price of paying SOVs.
Elasticity for HOVs as well as total elasticity were also calculated.
One month before each field experiment were compared to the same period in 2011. The pricing
plan used during the two periods was the same and also matched the prices during the baseline
period. Elasticity results were calculated using the net change in price and vehicle counts,
subtracting any changes occurring between 2011 and 2012 in the control period.
Elasticity for SOVs and HOVs follows the same format as Equation 5, where demand is replaced
with flow (veh/hour).
HOV and SOV vehicle counts for the MnPASS lanes during the three field experiments were
measured at the respective critical plazas. SOV counts are for “individual accounts” and exclude
“business accounts” or those with more than two transponders tied to one account. The values
are converted to flow (vehicles/hours) and are displayed in Table 12. Average prices can be
found in Table 9.
Using the change in vehicle flow and the average price change between the two periods, elasticity
values were calculated and are displayed below in Table 12.
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Table 12: Vehicle Flow and Elasticity
Flow in Vehicles/Hour (Q)
Baseline (B) Field (E) % Change Control % Change Net % Change Elasticity
(1) Plaza 1003
Total HOT 1083 1111 2.581 1.211 1.370 0.4086
HOV 665 636 -4.458 -8.391 3.673 1.095
SOV 416 475 14.29 16.62 -2.333 -0.6958
(2)
Plaza 3005
Total HOT 1043 1167 11.96 16.75 -4.791 0.0828
HOV 738 808 9.606 11.09 -1.481 0.0256
SOV 305 359 17.66 32.64 -14.97 0.2587
Plaza 3012
Total HOT 905 1071 18.30 19.33 -1.033 0.0365
HOV 678 789 16.40 16.19 0.2101 -0.0074
SOV 227 281 23.96 25.84 -1.882 0.0664
(3) Plaza 1003
Total HOT 817 821 0.4092 -4.108 4.517 0.1091
HOV 442 412 -6.779 -9.412 2.633 0.0636
SOV 375 409 8.867 4.519 4.348 0.1071
Time of Day: 7:00-9:00
(1) I394: FE: 2012-10-8 to 2012-11-2, Base: 2011-10-10 to 2011-11-4, Control: September 2011 and 2012
(2) I35W: FE: 2012-10-29 to 2012-11-23, Base: 2011-10-31 to 2011-11-25, Control: October 2011 and 2012
(3) I394: FE 2012-12-10 to 2012-12-21 & 2013-1-7 to 2013-1-25, Base: 2011-12-12 to 2011-12-23 & 2012-1-9
to 2012-1-27, Control: November2011 and 2012
Results of vehicle flow for the three field experiments tend to validate earlier results, with a few
exceptions. Both field experiments on I-394 saw a total net increase in flow. Previous results
showed net increases in density and SMnPASS during these experiments.
Results from the third field experiment were the most consistent with net increases in SOV and
HOV flow. These increases corresponded with an increase in price. These led to the positive
elasticity values in Table 12.
The changes in HOV flow are assumed to be existing HOVs on the corridor, which previously
used the GP lanes. It is believed the HOVs, like the SOVs, interpreted price as a signal of
downstream congestion and therefore, had additional incentive to use the MnPASS lanes when
the toll was higher (even though the lanes are always free for HOVs). Previously, moving left
to the MnPASS lanes may have provided insufficient benefit to some HOVs, which were using
the corridor for a short trip.
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6 Conclusion
With the increasing interest in HOT lanes around the US, it is important to understand drivers’
responses to varying toll prices. Specifically focusing on the MnPASS lanes on I-394 and I-35W
in Minneapolis, this paper found drivers paid between $60 and $124 per hour of travel time
savings. Consistent with other studies, these values suggest drivers are paying for more than
just travel time savings, but other factors such as reliability.
Analysis of driver elasticity using various methods yielded positive demand elasticity to price.
Both SOVs and HOVs increased usage of the MnPASS lanes with higher prices. Statistically
significant elasticities ranged between about +0.03 to +0.85. The increased demand resulting
from higher prices (and decreased demand from lower prices) is likely a result of driver per-
ception of the posted price. Drivers likely view the price as an indication of time savings and
congestion, suggesting higher prices provide greater time savings. No travel times or congestion
levels are made available to drivers entering MnPASS corridors, therefore, the MnPASS price
may act as a signal of downstream congestion. Drivers must make a quick decision whether to
use the MnPASS lanes and the posted price acts as one important factor. Other intangibles also
influence a user’s lane choice decision. In any case, drivers are consuming different goods when
the toll varies, because time savings is not constant. These different goods represent different
demand curves and not movement along one downward sloping demand curve Beggs (2010).
Therefore, although price is higher, quantity consumed is also higher.
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